Blocking intrusion attacks at an offending host

ABSTRACT

A method, apparatus, and program product are provided for protecting a network from intrusions. An offending packet communicated by an offending host coupled to a protected network is detected. In response to the detection, a blocking instruction is returned to the offending host to initiate an intrusion protection operation on the offending host, where the blocking instruction inhibits further transmission of offending packets by the offending host. At the offending host, a blocking instruction is received with a portion of an offending packet. The offending host verifies that the offending packet originated from the host. In response to the verification of the offending packet originating from the host, an intrusion protection operation is initiated on the host thereby inhibiting transmission of a subsequent outbound offending packet by the host.

FIELD OF THE INVENTION

The present invention relates to the field of computer security, andmore particularly to the prevention of unauthorized intrusion intocomputer networks and systems.

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION

As information technology has become popularized with the assistance ofthe rapid development of information and communication technologycombined with computers, network environments, and the Internet, so toohas malicious network access, such as intrusions into server systems andthe transmission of harmful traffic. A number of conventional securitysolutions are available to block malicious network accesses. Thesesystems traditionally include the use of firewalls or dedicated networkintrusion detection systems on a protected network.

Intrusion detection, in general, can be performed manually orautomatically. Manual intrusion detection typically incorporatesexamining a log file system record or other evidence for signs ofintrusions, including the amount of network traffic to or from a systemor network. Systems that perform automatic intrusion detection aretypically referred to as Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS). An IDS canbe either host-based, if it monitors system calls or logs, ornetwork-based if it monitors the flow of network packets. ConventionalIDS's are generally a combination of these two approaches. When aprobable intrusion is discovered by a conventional IDS, typical actionsto perform include logging relevant information to a file or database,generating an email alert, or generating a message to a pager or mobilephone.

Determining what the probable intrusion actually is and taking some formof action to stop it or prevent it from happening again are usuallyoutside the scope of intrusion detection. However, some forms ofautomatic reaction have been implemented through the interaction ofIntrusion Detection Systems and access control systems such asfirewalls.

Extrusion detection (or outbound intrusion detection) is a branch ofintrusion detection aimed at developing mechanisms to identifysuccessful and unsuccessful attempts to use the resources of a computersystem to compromise other systems. Extrusion detection techniquesgenerally focus on the analysis of system activity and outbound trafficin order to detect malicious users, networks or malware (malicioussoftware) or network traffic that may pose a threat to the security ofneighboring systems.

While intrusion detection is most concerned about the identification ofincoming attacks (intrusion attempts), extrusion detection systems tryto prevent attacks from being launched in the first place. Theyimplement monitoring controls at “leaf” nodes of a protectednetwork—rather than concentrating them at choke points, e.g. routers—inorder to distribute the inspection workload and to take advantage of thevisibility that a system has of its own state. The ultimate goal ofextrusion detection is to identify attack attempts launched from analready compromised system in order to prevent them from reaching theirtarget, thereby containing the impact of the threat.

Contemporary IDS and IPS (intrusion/extrusion defense) technologies,while effective, do not completely solve the problems associated withintrusion or extrusion attacks. If they do detect and initiate adefense, in most cases the prevention is implemented at thedestination—either at the host or firewall in front of the host. Theoffending host or hosts may continue to launch the intrusion (in casessuch as Denial of Service (DoS) or Distributed DOS (DDoS))—with theprevention including adding packet filters or dynamic logic to toss outor ignore the inbound offending packets, resulting in additionalfirewall or host processing.

What is needed therefore is a method for notifying an offending host ofan intrusion attack so that proper action can be taken at the offendinghost to inhibit further transmission of the attack.

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

Embodiments of the invention provide methods of protecting a networkfrom intrusion attacks by notifying an offending host of the attack andtaking action at the offending host based on an intrusion protectionpolicy. An intrusion of an offending packet is detected, which iscommunicated by an offending host coupled to a protected network. Ablocking instruction is returned to the offending host, in response todetecting the intrusion of the offending packet, to initiate anintrusion protection operation on the offending host. The blockinginstruction inhibits further transmission of offending packets by theoffending host. In some embodiments, at least a portion of the offendingpacket is sent back to the offending host with the blocking instruction.

At the offending host, the blocking instruction is received with, insome embodiments, the portion of the offending packet. The offendinghost verifies that the offending packet originated from the offendinghost and inhibits transmission of a subsequent outbound offending packetby the offending host based on an intrusion policy. In some embodimentsthe intrusion protection operation includes posting an event or errormessage for an operator of the offending host or accessing an intrusionpolicy on the offending host.

In one embodiment, sending a portion of the first offending packet backto the offending host includes encapsulating the portion of theoffending data packet into a UDP packet and returning the encapsulatedportion of the offending data packet to the offending host as anotification packet. At the offending host, the encapsulated UDP packetcontaining the portion of the offending packet is received. Theoffending host verifies that the first offending packet originated fromthe offending host. In some embodiments, the offending host may identifyan offending application on the offending host that originated theoffending packet, and may terminate the offending application.

In another embodiment, detecting the intrusion and returning theblocking instruction are implemented at an IP layer of an operatingsystem. The blocking instruction is implemented as an ICMP message, andin some embodiments, the ICMP message contains a copy of the firstoffending packet. In other embodiments, detecting the intrusion andreturning the blocking instruction are implemented in a network devicesuch as a firewall, a router, or another computer.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

The accompanying drawings, which are incorporated in and constitute apart of this specification, illustrate embodiments of the invention and,together with a general description of the invention given above, andthe detailed description given below, serve to explain the principles ofthe invention.

FIG. 1 is a flowchart showing the actions of a computer under anintrusion attack in connection with intrusion protection consistent withembodiments of the invention.

FIG. 2 is a flowchart showing the actions at an offending host computerafter being notified by the computer in FIG. 1.

FIG. 3 is a diagram showing an exemplary intrusion by an offending hostthrough a proxy of a protected network as shown in FIGS. 1 and 2.

FIG. 4 is a diagram showing an exemplary intrusion by an offending hoston either a local network or a protected network as shown in FIGS. 1 and2.

FIG. 5 is a block diagram of an exemplary hardware and softwareenvironment for a computer suitable for implementing intrusionprotection illustrated in FIGS. 1-4.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

Embodiments of the invention provide methods of protecting a networkfrom intrusion attacks by notifying an offending host of the attack andtaking action at the offending host based on an intrusion protectionpolicy. An intrusion of an offending packet is detected on a computer orother network component coupled to a protected network. After detection,a blocking instruction is returned to the offending host to initiate anintrusion protection operation on the offending host. The intrusionprotection operation inhibits further transmission of offending packetsby the offending host. Using this approach in combination withcontemporary prevention techniques may provide a more robust solution tointrusion and extrusion attacks.

FIG. 1 illustrates the actions taken at a computer or network componenton a protected network. The network component may be incorporated incontemporary intrusion protection, which may be a router or a firewallin some embodiments. A packet is received on the protected network froman offending host in block 10. This packet may be of the type associatedwith an intrusion (or extrusion) attack. As discussed above, bothintrusions and extrusions are to be detected and potentially blocked atthe offending host. For purposes of this application, both intrusionsand extrusions will be referred to as intrusions. The computer ornetwork component then checks the packet to see if it is an offendingpacket, such as a malformed packet, a denial of service (DoS) or adistributed denial of service (DDoS) packet, for example. If the packetis detected to be an offending packet (“yes” branch of decision block12), then a blocking instruction is returned to the offending host inblock 14. If the packet is not of the type associated with an intrusion(“no” branch of decision block 12), then the network component orcomputer continues to receive packets. In other embodimentsincorporating contemporary intrusion protection operations, otheractions may be taken as discussed above with IDS and IPSimplementations.

A single offending host can send offending packets to many computers onmany networks. This in turn can generate excessive network traffic aseach of the computers transmits data back to the offending host. Toassist in reducing the amount of network traffic, blocking instructionsin some embodiments may be implemented on a computer in a protectednetwork to be periodically sent to the offending host, rather than sentat a time an offending packet is received. The transmission of blockinginstructions may be set so that the transmissions are sent at intervalsbut no more than a predetermined number of times. If an offending hostis receiving more than a certain number of blocking instructions, themultiple receipts may indicate that there is an actual problem at theoffending host which should be addressed.

At the offending host, as seen in the flowchart in FIG. 2, a blockinginstruction is received in block 20. The offending host verifies thatthe blocking instruction is likely to have originated from the host.Verification of the packet may be accomplished in some embodiments bychecking the MAC address associated with the packet when applicable,such as on a local network, or for other embodiments, verification maybe accomplished by checking the source and destination IP addresses,and/or the source and destination ports of the offending packet. If theoffending host determines that the packet originated from the host(“yes” branch of decision block 22), then an intrusion policyimplemented on the offending host is consulted for a proper course ofaction in block 24. An intrusion protection operation is then initiatedin block 25 to inhibit further transmission of offending packets basedon the intrusion policy. If the offending host determines that thepacket did not originate from the host (“no” branch of decision block22), then the offending host checks to see if it is receiving multipleinstances of a blocking instruction. If the host is receiving multipleinstances of a blocking instruction for packets that do not appear tohave originated from the offending host (“yes” branch of decision block26), the intrusion policy is consulted in block 24 and an appropriateintrusion protection operation is initiated in block 25. If the host isnot receiving multiple instances of blocking instructions, then in someembodiments, the intrusion policy may be consulted for a course ofaction for a false detection in block 27.

Intrusion policies may be implemented so no action will be taken withoutpermission from the offending host either through human interaction orother automated means. These policies may be put into place to preventrogue blocking instructions from shutting down valid applicationsrunning on “offending” host computers. Therefore, a policy for anoffending host may simply define the intrusion protection operation aslogging the intrusion of the offending host in a system or event log. Insome embodiments, an operator of the offending host may also be notifiedby posting messages on the host or by sending error messages to theoperator. The offending host may further define the intrusion protectionoperation to send messages to other locations through email or by usingother electronic transmissions such as sending a message to a personaldata assistant or cellular telephone. Once the operator has beeninformed of the intrusion attack, the operator may take additionalaction by identifying the source of the intrusion. Depending on the typeof intrusion, the operator may shut down the offending host or anapplication execution on the host responsible for generating theoffending packets.

On a local or more trusted network, for example, if the intrusion was aDoS intrusion, the intrusion protection operation dictated by the policymay allow for automatic shutdown of an application or processresponsible for generating the DoS. Similarly for malformed packets, theintrusion protection operation directed by the policy may automaticallyshut down the application or direct the offending host to automaticallystop further transmission of the malformed packets. However, if theblocking instruction originated from computer on a different or remotenetwork, then there may be a lower level of trust and the policy drivingthe intrusion protection operations taken by the offending host may beimplemented such that an operator is informed of the intrusion attack byposting an event or an error message or sending a communication to theoperator in some other manner as discussed above. Implementation ofintrusion policies is a method to assist in preventing the use ofblocking instructions as attacks against legitimate and validapplications running on other computers. The more trust that existsbetween a computer and an offending host may allow for more automatedintrusion protection operations to remedy a validated intrusion.

In some situations, as seen in FIG. 3, the intrusion may occur through aproxy. Offending host 30 sends offending packets through a proxycomputer 32 to the Internet 34 or other local or wide area networks. Theoffending packets arrive at a protected network 36, which may beprotected by firewall 38 in some embodiments. Computers 40 a-40 d maydetect the intrusion from the proxy computer 32 and send a blockinginstruction back to the proxy computer 32. The proxy computer 32 may notdetect that the intrusion has originated from itself as discussed withFIG. 2 above, but may be able to determine, through an intrusion policy,that the packets originated from the original offending host 30. Afterthe detection is made, the proxy computer 32 in some embodiments,according to the intrusion policy may issue an intrusion protectionoperation that shuts down the transmission at the proxy computer 32 ornotifies an operator as discussed above. In other embodiments, the proxycomputer 32 may modify the offending packet to have the properidentification, i.e., IP address and ports, of the offending host 30 andthen send the blocking instruction back to the offending host 30 whereappropriate action may be taken. In still other embodiments, anintrusion protection operation may be implemented based on the policy atthe proxy computer 32 as well as sending the blocking instruction to theoffending host 30.

Blocking instructions for intrusion protection may be implemented, insome embodiments, at the IP Layer of an operating system and useoperating system calls similar to ICMP REDIRECT or ICMP ECHO RESPONSE. Aspecial ICMP message, ICMP BLOCK may be implemented to accommodateblocking instructions. This would assist in preventing hackers fromaltering the intrusion handling logic (for example, through the use ofdigital signatures). Because a lot of intrusions are initiated by rogueapplications, having the protection logic in the operating system mayassist in protecting against those intrusions initiated from theapplication layer. Referring now to FIG. 4, an offending host 50connected to the Internet 52 has initiated an intrusion either on, forexample, computer 58 a connected by a local network 54 or on computer 64a on protected network 60 connected through the Internet 52 and remotefrom the offending host 50. Protected network 60 may be protected by afirewall 62, in some embodiments, or other known components used inpreventing intrusion attacks. Computers 64 a-64 d on network 60 may beservers that are the subject of the intrusion attack.

When an intrusion is detected on network 60, by either the firewall 62or other detection devices, for example, computer 64 a, a blockinginstruction in the form of an ICMP BLOCK is sent back to the offendinghost 50 indicating that it is the originator of the intrusion. Forexample, computer 64 a would send an ICMP BLOCK back to the offendinghost 50 that contains information regarding the type of intrusion and insome embodiments a portion of the packet that was transmitted as part ofthe intrusion. Depending on the type of intrusion, e.g. DoS, anintrusion policy could be implemented on the offending host 50 thatdetermines an appropriate action based on the ICMP BLOCK received. Atthis stage, an operator of the offending host may be presented with alist of options as to the appropriate action to take as discussed above.In this example, offending host 50 is not likely a trusted host inrelation to computer 64 a, for example, because the two computers are ondifferent networks. Therefore, the policy for the offending host 50 maysimply define the intrusion protection operation as logging theintrusion of the offending host 50 in a system or event log.

With continued reference to FIG. 4, intrusion attacks originating fromthe offending host 50 may also be directed toward computers 58 a-58 c onthe local network 54 as well as be directed through the Internet 52 toprotected network 60. Using a process similar to that discussed above,an intrusion attack is detected at a computer, for example, computer 58a. Upon detection, the computer 58 a sends an IMCP BLOCK back to theoffending host 50. As discussed above, the ICMP BLOCK may contain aportion of the offending packet with additional information used by theoffending host 50 to verify that the offending packet originated fromthe host 50. Once verified, the offending host 50 may take two differentapproaches based on the level of trust between computer 58 a and theoffending host 50. For example, if the intrusion policy implementedrecognizes a trusted relationship between computer 58 a and theoffending host 50, i.e., being part of the same local area network, theintrusion protection operation dictated by the intrusion policy mayallow for automatic shutdown of an application or processes responsiblefor generating the offending packet, such as a DoS. Similarly formalformed packets the intrusion protection operation directed by theintrusion policy may automatically shut down the application or directthe offending host 50 to automatically stop transmission of themalformed packets. Alternatively, in other embodiments, the intrusionpolicy may implement Variable Dynamic Throttling as disclosed in U.S.patent application Ser. No. 11/752,972 (ROC920070033US1), which isherein incorporated by reference in its entirety. Variable DynamicThrottling allows for varying rates of denial and permission of networktraffic over a customized interval of time. However, if there isn't atrusted relationship, such as with computer 64 a on a different network60 as discussed previously, then the level of trust may be lower and thepolicy driving the intrusion protection operations taken by theoffending host 50 may limited to informing an operator of the intrusionattack by posting an event or an error message or sending acommunication to the operator in some other manner. As discussed above,intrusion policies may be used to assist in preventing the use of ICMPBLOCKS as attacks against legitimate and valid applications running onother computers. The more trust that exists between a computer such ascomputer 58 a and the offending host 50 may allow for more automatedintrusion protection operations to remedy a validated intrusion.

In other embodiments, instead of implementing intrusion detection andnotification at the IP layer of an operating system, a server may beimplemented on each computer that is configured to listen on a UDP port.The intrusion detection process and notification comprises similar stepsbut instead of sending an ICMP BLOCK, a UDP message is encapsulated withat least a portion of an offending packet and is transmitted to a UDPport of the offending host. Once received on the UDP port, similarprocessing would take place based on implemented intrusion policies andappropriate intrusion protection operations. Because this method is notimplemented in the operating system, as is the IP layer that includesICMP messages, an operating system API may need to be used inconjunction with the intrusion protection operation to interact withapplications and processes in order to shut them down or sendnotifications to operators. Using UDP messages would require a server tobe executing on all computers, which could be facilitated by packagingthe server as part of an operating system bundle.

FIG. 5 illustrates an exemplary hardware and software environment for anapparatus 70, which may be configured as the offending hosts 30, 50 inFIGS. 3 and 4, the proxy computer 32 in FIG. 3, or any of the computerson the local or remote networks 36, 54, and 60 in FIGS. 3 and 4. For thepurposes of the invention, apparatus 70 may represent practically anycomputer, computer system, or programmable device e.g., multi-user orsingle-user computers, desktop computers, portable computers anddevices, handheld devices, network devices, mobile phones, etc.Apparatus 70 will hereinafter be referred to as a “computer” although itshould be appreciated that the term “apparatus” may also include othersuitable programmable electronic devices, such as routers or firewalls.

Computer 70 typically includes at least one processor 72 coupled to amemory 74. Processor 72 may represent one or more processors (e.g.microprocessors), and memory 74 may represent the random access memory(RAM) devices comprising the main storage of computer 70, as well as anysupplemental levels of memory, e.g., cache memories, non-volatile orbackup memories (e.g. programmable or flash memories), read-onlymemories, etc. In addition, memory 74 may be considered to includememory storage physically located elsewhere in computer 70, e.g., anycache memory in a processor 72, as well as any storage capacity used asa virtual memory, e.g., as stored on a mass storage device 76 or anothercomputer coupled to computer 70 via a network 78.

Computer 70 also typically receives a number of inputs and outputs forcommunicating information externally. For interface with a user oroperator, computer 70 typically includes one or more user input devices80 (e.g., a keyboard, a mouse, a trackball, a joystick, a touchpad, akeypad, a stylus, and/or a microphone, among others). Computer 70 mayalso include a display 82 (e.g., a CRT monitor, an LCD display panel,and/or a speaker, among others). The interface to computer 70 may alsobe through an external terminal connected directly or remotely tocomputer 70, or through another computer communicating with computer 70via a network 78, modem, or other type of communications device.

Computer 70 operates under the control of an operating system 84, andexecutes or otherwise relies upon various computer softwareapplications, components, programs, objects, modules, data structures,etc. (e.g. application 86) collectively referred to as “objects”.Application 86, for example, may be an application, as discussed above,initiating an intrusion onto another system or a network, or application86 may be a target of an intrusion by an offending application on thisor another computer. Computer 70 communicates on the network 78 througha network interface 88 using a network protocol (e.g. implemented in theIP layer 90) and/or ports (e.g. UDP ports 92) implemented in theoperating system 84, for example.

In general, the routines executed to implement the embodiments of theinvention, whether implemented as part of an operating system or aspecific application; component, program, object, module or sequence ofinstructions will be referred to herein as “computer program code”, orsimply “program code”. The computer program code typically comprises oneor more instructions that are resident at various times in variousmemory and storage devices in a computer, and that, when read andexecuted by one or more processors in a computer, causes that computerto perform the steps necessary to execute steps or elements embodyingthe various aspects of the invention. Moreover, while the invention hasand hereinafter will be described in the context of fully functioningcomputers and computer systems, those skilled in the art will appreciatethat the various embodiments of the invention are capable of beingdistributed as a program product in a variety of forms, and that theinvention applies equally regardless of the particular type of computerreadable media used to actually carry out the distribution. Examples ofcomputer readable media include but are not limited to physical,recordable type media such as volatile and non-volatile memory devices,floppy and other removable disks, hard disk drives, optical disks (e.g.,CD-ROM's, DVD's, etc.), among others, and transmission type media suchas digital and analog communication links.

In addition, various program code described herein may be identifiedbased upon the application or software component within which it isimplemented in specific embodiments of the invention. However, it shouldbe appreciated that any particular program nomenclature used herein ismerely for convenience, and thus the invention should not be limited touse solely in any specific application identified and/or implied by suchnomenclature. Furthermore, given the typically endless number of mannersin which computer programs may be organized into routines, procedures,methods, modules, objects, and the like, as well as the various mannersin which program functionality may be allocated among various softwarelayers that are resident within a typical computer (e.g., operatingsystems, libraries, APIs, applications, applets, etc.), it should beappreciated that the invention is not limited to the specificorganization and allocation of program functionality described herein.

Those skilled in the art will recognize that the exemplary environmentillustrated in FIG. 5 is not intended to limit the present invention.Indeed, those skilled in the art will recognize that other alternativehardware and/or software environments may be used without departing fromthe scope of the invention.

While all of the present invention has been illustrated by a descriptionof various embodiments and while these embodiments have been describedin considerable detail, it is not the intention of the applicants torestrict or in any way limit the scope of the appended claims to suchdetail. Additional advantages and modifications will readily appear tothose skilled in the art, such as applying this technique to existingnetwork security systems. The invention in its broader aspects istherefore not limited to the specific details, representative apparatusand method, and illustrative examples shown and described. Accordingly,departures may be made from such details without departing from thespirit or scope of the applicant's general inventive concept.

What is claimed is:
 1. A method of protecting a network from intrusions,the method comprising: receiving a blocking instruction and at least aportion of an offending packet at a host, wherein the host comprises aserver computer upon which is executed an operating system and at leastone application that originates the offending packet, wherein theoffending packet is of the type associated with an intrusion attack;verifying that the offending packet originated from the host; and inresponse to the verification of the offending packet originating fromthe host, initiating an intrusion protection operation on the hostthereby inhibiting origination of a subsequent outbound offending packetby the application executed upon the host.
 2. The method of claim 1wherein the host comprises: a first host configured as a proxy; and asecond host originating the offending packet and transmitting theoffending packet through the proxy, wherein the blocking instruction isreceived at the proxy.
 3. The method of claim 2 wherein the proxytransmits the blocking instruction to the second host.
 4. The method ofclaim 1 wherein verifying further comprises: comparing corresponding MACaddresses associated with the offending packet and the offending host.5. The method of claim 1 wherein verifying further comprises: comparingsource and destination IP addresses associated with the offending packetand the offending host.
 6. The method of claim 1 wherein verifyingfurther comprises: checking TCP or UDP source and destination portsassociated with the first offending packet and the offending host. 7.The method of claim 1 wherein the offending packet is a TCP packet andverifying further comprises: checking sequence numbers associated withthe offending packet and the offending host.
 8. The method of claim 1wherein inhibiting transmission further comprises: returning thesubsequent outbound offending packet to an offending application,wherein the offending packet and subsequent outbound offending packetoriginated from the offending application; and ending a connection withthe offending application.
 9. The method of claim 1 wherein the at leasta portion of the offending packet is encapsulated into a UDP packet andis returned to the offending host as a notification packet.
 10. Themethod of claim 9 wherein the intrusion protection operation comprises,at the offending host: identifying an offending application on theoffending host that originated the offending packet; and terminating theoffending application.
 11. The method of claim 1 wherein the intrusionprotection operation comprises, at the offending host: posting an eventor error message for an operator of the offending host.
 12. The methodof claim 1 wherein the intrusion protection operation comprises:accessing an intrusion policy on the offending host.
 13. The method ofclaim 1 wherein the blocking instruction is an ICMP message.
 14. Anapparatus comprising: a processor; and program code configured to beexecuted by the processor to protect a network from intrusions at ahost, wherein the host comprises a server computer upon which isexecuted an operating system and at least one application thatoriginates an offending packet, the program code resident in a memoryand configured to receive a blocking instruction and a portion of theoffending packet, verify that the offending packet originated from thehost, and in response to the verification of the offending packetoriginating from the host, initiate an intrusion protection operation onthe host thereby inhibiting origination of a subsequent outboundoffending packet by the application executed upon the host.
 15. Theapparatus of claim 14 wherein the computer is a first computerconfigured as a proxy, the apparatus further comprising: a secondcomputer having a second memory; and second program code of an offendingapplication, the second program code resident in the second memory ofthe second computer and configured to originate the offending packet andtransmit the offending packet through the proxy, wherein the blockinginstruction is received at the proxy.
 16. The apparatus of claim 15wherein the proxy is further configured to transmit the blockinginstruction to the second computer.
 17. A program product, comprising: anon-transitory computer readable medium; and program code configured toprotect a network from intrusions at a host, wherein the host comprisesa server computer upon which is executed an operating system and atleast one application that originates an offending packet, the programcode resident on the computer readable medium and configured to receivea blocking instruction and a portion of the offending packet, verifythat the offending packet originated from the host, and in response tothe verification of the offending packet originating from the host,initiate an intrusion protection operation on the host therebyinhibiting origination of a subsequent outbound offending packet by theapplication executed upon the host.
 18. The program product of claim 17wherein the computer is a first computer configured as a proxy, theapparatus further comprising: a second computer having a second memory;and second program code of an offending application, the second programcode resident in the second memory of the second computer and configuredto originate the offending packet and transmit the offending packetthrough the proxy, wherein the blocking instruction is received at theproxy.
 19. The program product of claim 18 wherein the proxy is furtherconfigured to transmit the blocking instruction to the second computer.